‘Passions can be contrary to reason only so far as they are accompany’d with some [false] judgment or opinion . . . and even then ‘tis not the passion, properly speaking, which is unreasonable, but the judgment.’ - Hume
Introduction
Hume’s argument can be divided into two parts:
To assess these claims, it is crucial to first clarify what Hume means by ‘reason’[Footnote: Much confusion in philosophy is generated by use of the same term by different philosophers in different ways, which I think is highly unfortunate], and see the statement in light of the original context in which it is made. After these qualifications, it will be clear, I hope, that Hume’s statement is true in a narrow, self-evident sense, but not quite true if refine the definitions of what is meant by being unreasonable and being contrary to reason.
Definitions and Hume’s Argument
Hume conceives of ‘reason’ as being either demonstrative: an abstract relation of ideas separate from the real world, or probable: a relation of objects of which experience gives us information. We discover these relations through the process of ‘reasoning’, which might involve observation, experimentation, comparisons and logical deductions. The discovery of cause and effect between objects in the real world, and the enterprise of Mathematics, for example, belong to the domain of reason. Reason, thus conceived, is something which is strictly divorced from passions; it is cognitive, passive.
Footnote[Such a conception of what constitutes reason is very different from, say, what Bernard Williams means by ‘internal and external reasons’, which are motivations encapsulated by such statements as ‘‘A has reason to do X’’ or ‘‘A has reason for X’’, and thus incorporate our desires, passions and commitments. But it is rather closer to Kant’s conception of reason, which is based on deduction from rational principles without any appeal to pleasure, pain, empathy or sympathy.]
What, then, does it mean for something to be contrary to reason, or be unreasonable? Humean reason is essentially a web of relations among facts and ideas, whose truth is established through discovery and deliberation. For example, the following is a demonstration of reason:
In (1) if I believe X exists and Y doesn’t, it will be contrary to reason. In (2) if my sole goal is to avoid Z and for that I judge to do X, it will be contrary to reason. In (3), if I hold the opinion that one ought to do Y despite willing X, it will be contrary to reason (at least according to Kant). All these beliefs, opinions or judgments, which run contrary to that web of relations which Hume calls reason, can be said to be irrational, or false. Let us call such relations capable of having a truth value a ‘proposition’. They are representative quantities in that they represent things a certain way, and they are true iff things are in the way the proposition represents them to be. If a proposition is in disagreement with any observations, facts or other true ideas, it is said to be false and contrary to reason. When a proposition is contrary to reason, it stands in contradiction with other true propositions. Insofar such a contradiction is necessary for them to be contrary to reason, only propositions, which Hume calls ‘objects of reason’, can be contrary to reason, and nothing else. As Hume explains, ‘‘nothing can be contrary to truth or reason, except what has a reference to it’’.
Hume notes two scenarios when passion can be called unreasonable:
These cases can be bundled together by saying that a passion is unreasonable when it is based on false propositions, and in both cases false propositions lead to false judgments. Hence it is not the passion which is unreasonable, but the judgement.
Thus it is seems that passion by themselves cannot be contrary to reason by definition, at least unless they can become objects of reason themselves. Consider the following propositions:
Surely, statement (3) cannot be accused of being contrary to reason. It is a matter of fact, it has its own existence independent of what (1) is or (2) is.
Consider the following dialogue with a conflicted masochist:
'’I love to hurt myself!’’ ‘‘But do you love being hurt?’’ ‘‘No! I hate being hurt’’
Even here, the love-hate emotions of the masochist are merely in conflict with each other, not with reason. Emotions can neither align with or against reason. As Hume says, ‘Passion is an original existence, or if you will, modification of existence, and contains no representative quality, which renders it a copy of any other existence or modification. When I am angry, I am actually possest with the passion, and in that emotion have no more a reference to any other object, than when I am thirsty, or sick, or more than five foot high’
On the other hand, consider this:
Now statement (3) can be said to be in line with reason as it follows from (1) and (2), but the statement has assumed the shape of a belief, or a proposition, not a statement of feeling. It has cognitive content.
Being Unreasonable vs Being Contrary to Reason
It is clear that passions cannot be contrary to reason, almost by definition. But does it mean that passions are never unreasonable? I don’t believe this to be so. This is because there’s another sense in which we use the term unreasonable. When something is unreasonable, it means merely that it cannot be explained away by the process of reasoning. Saying it is ‘contrary to reason’ is a stronger assertion which needs the demonstration of some contradiction. I argue that although passions are not contrary to reason, they can still be unreasonable.
1. Common Language
Consider the case of a musician who is moved producing soulful melodies only when from the depths of despair. If a voice of reason tells him that his raison d’être is to produce soulful melodies, would his feeling despair become reasonable? Certainly not. That would be absurd. Passions cannot be arrived at through. But we do, in everyday language, accuse passions of being unreasonable or reasonable. When someone is angry, he is oft faced with the retort ‘Your anger is unreasonable’. If we are to accept Hume’s claim, then we must either admit that our everyday language is mistaken, or we must show that the way we use these terms is consistent with his view.
Consider the following propositions:
My happiness in (3) can be called unreasonable (and yet not be either contrary or in line with Humean reason), while my sadness in (3) could be termed reasonable (and yet not be either contrary or in line with Humean reason). This is a crucial point. Someone’s sentiments would be reasonable, if it is possible to trace its existence as an effect of prior causes through relations of the form ‘‘If X happens, Y is likely to feel F. X happened. So Y is feeling F’’. In our everyday usage, the discovery of cause and effect, which is part of Humean reason, isn’t restricted to material objects alone, but to passions as well. [Footnote:Propositions like (1), do not have a place in Humean reason, since they can’t be empirically tested and validated, or formulated as facts. But they do belong to reason as we use the term in everyday language].
When we accuse someone’s passion of being unreasonable, we imply that if the person were to place the matter under rational deliberation, such as of causes and effects, he would have reason to feel differently, or modify his sentiments. Rational deliberation alone can give rise to an internal reason. Such modified sentiments might arise from the person perceiving the situation in a different light, such as becoming aware of facts he had previously ignored or altering the truth value of propositions he had believed in. This brings us to the matter of perception.
2. Perceptions and Passions
Consider people’s varying reaction to art. One might think of a Bach’s fugue as boring and sleep inducing. One might think that Beckett’s plays or Joyce’s novels are utter hogwash. One might feel that sexist or racist jokes are the most hilarious. But once made aware of the elegant patterns in Bach’s melody, or the underlying existential theme of a Beckett play or the implicit problems in racist remarks, one would probably start feeling otherwise. Wouldn’t I be right in calling the earlier feelings, insofar they stemmed from ignorance and insensitivity, unreasonable? If ignorance could be equated to a false belief, then it would be unreasonable in the Humean sense of the term.
But Hume would counter-argue that in this case it is our judgement of art which is unreasonable, not the passion per se. But can we really de-link judgment from passions here? In the case of aesthetic appreciation of art, perception immediately gives way to passion, and judgment, if any, comes later.
It is an important distinction between passions and reasons that although the former can be blind to reality, the latter, by definition, can’t. While passions can possibly (though not necessarily) distort our reality, the force of reason aligns it back. The voice of reason changes our perception, which in turn changes our passions. Reason, thus, can directly change our passions, and not merely direct them, as Hume seems to suggest.
3. Passions and Judgments
More often than not, passions are not merely accompanied by wrong judgement, but actually cause it. Emotions are breeding ground for fallacies and cognitive biases. The law recognizes it. In many countries a ‘crime of passion’ is subject to leniency in punishment while a premeditated one isn’t. The former falls under manslaughter while the latter under murder. The accompanying Humean judgement underlying both the actions is the same, but the former is less wrong than the latter. The lawyer tries to argue that the man committed murder because he was under the influence of passion, and that passion was reasonable (by appealing to statements of the form ‘‘If X happens, one is likely to feel Y’’ e.g. ‘‘If a man’s wife commits adultery, he is likely to feel rage’’), which makes the crime of passion less unreasonable. If passions were totally excluded from the domain of reason, there would be no ground for the lawyer to make his argument.
Conclusion
Hume’s claim that passion can’t be contrary to reason seems to follow self-evidently from his definition of reason. But he uses the terms ‘contrary to reason’ interchangeably with ‘unreasonable’. While this use can be justified, I believe that in doing so we miss out on an important sense in which we use ‘unreasonable’. When something is unreasonable, it just means that it cannot be explained away by the process of reasoning. Saying passions are ‘contrary to reason’ is a stronger assertion which needs the further assertion of contradiction with some existing true proposition in the Humean reason category. Under all rational discussions of emotions, such as in the rhetoric ‘Your anger is unreasonable’, or in explanation of our aesthetic preferences, or crimes of passions, a notion of reasonableness or unreasonableness is useful. Under Hume’s definition of reason, these notions would need to be abandoned. Thus, his definition is very limiting. If we do include statements of the sort ‘Y causes feeling X’ in Humean reason, then his claim that passions can’t be unreasonable cannot be defended.
16 November 2014