Determinism is the philosophical position that our every future state is uniquely determined by prior states. For every event, including all human actions, there’s a set of existing conditions which would cause that event and nothing else. Indeterminism, on the other hand, holds that there are events which are not completely determined by prior events. To get a flavour of the question, consider this:
John is in the middle of an agonizing moral conundrum. Say he’s holding a lever which controls a trolley barreling down a rail track on its way to kill 2 people who are tied up and unable to move. If he pulls the lever, she will switch the trolley to a different track which has a single person. John is caught between the utilitarian obligation and his own sense of moral responsibility (he feels he’ll be personally responsible for the death if he pulls the lever). At this juncture, a scientist appears from nowhere. He tells John this: That he has this whole scientific thesis which tells, to full accuracy, exactly which choice he is going to make. It takes into account his entire life history, all his physiological state, beliefs, desires and motivations. And he cannot possibly do anything else other than what the science predicts.
What effect should this have on John’s sense of moral responsibility? Can we say, since the laws of cause and effect are already in place, that John can be discharged of moral responsibility at this juncture?
I believe that the new knowledge is quite irrelevant to John. Regardless of whether his actions are predetermined or not, he will still face the same moral burden. From his point of view, the metaphysical claims of determinism and indeterminism are not quite germane to his feelings of moral responsibility.
Is it even possible to change our views about moral responsibility?
Whether a scientific thesis can lead us to change our views about moral responsibility is one question, whether it should is another. But the latter question only makes sense if it is possible to change our view in the first place. Thinking about moral responsibility is an indispensable part of the way we think about human action, both our own and of others. When we judge an action, we do not see it objectively from a scientific perspective, but from a vicarious occupation of the agent’s point of view. We see ourselves and others as agents with values and motivations and reasons which explain action, not as mere physical beings following laws of nature.
As Strawson says,
``A sustained objectivity of inter-personal attitude, and the human isolation which that would entail, does not seem to be something of which human beings would be capable, even if some general truth were a theoretical ground for it…This commitment is part of the general framework of human life, not something that can come up for review as particular cases can come up for review within this general framework….’
It can be argued that we do we change our views about moral responsibility when it comes to young children, schizophrenics, or psychologically deranged. Or even in normal cases, for example, when someone says, “But he has been under great stress lately…”. In so far as these cases are exception rather than norm, an objective view, rather than an internal one, can be taken up in these cases. But it is worth noting that our change in thinking about moral responsibility in these cases are not borne out of a theoretical conviction about whether determinism is true or not. They are rather based on the belief that in such cases people have been incapacitate in some or all respects of ordinary moral thought, and hence are to be judged on different grounds. When an agent is capable of making a moral decision, we cannot but hold him accountable, regardless of what science says about determinism.
Enabling Moral Maturity
Our conventional views about moral responsbility have another function as well. In treating people as being moral beings, we allow them to become so. In the case of young children, we do not hold them morally responsible for their wrongdoings. However, by treating them as being morally responsible, we enable their moral development. By praising or scolding them for actions of which they do not have full moral understanding, we get them to acquire such understanding in the first place. Another instance of where this aspect can be seen is in the relationship of a psycho-analyst with her patient.
On the other hand, if we were to teach our children morality taking into account science’s view of determinism and indeterminism, for example, by saying things like “The state of your being leads you to commit the act, and you could do nothing else”, then the child might develop a sense of alienation from his acts and not develop the full moral appreciation of them. Only by thinking about the various alternatives and believing in an open future in which free will has a role, even if just a mere illusion, can the child develop moral maturity.
Consequentialist justification
Another utility of our conventional views about moral responsibility can be framed in consequentialist terms. It might be argued, for example, that by holding people morally responsible, we encourage or discourage future actions and events. Holding people accountable in certain ways leads them to modify their behaviour and deter or encourage others to behave likewise. It might be just because these people think (however mistakenly) that they are morally responsible and could have behaved in alternative ways. Thus, the notion of moral responsibility serves a function which is independent of what the scientific answer to determinism or indetermism is.
Human Interpersonal Relationships and Institutions
Finally, a notion of moral responsibility is necessary for human interpersonal relationships and institutions to work, regardless of what our convictions about determinism and indeterminism are. Such institutions might collapse if we are to base our worldview on an answer to whether determinism is true or false. If science tells us that determinism is true, and that people are set on a deterministic path in a mechanical way, then basing our worldview on that conviction would entail the collapse of the institution of punishment and correction, the design of social policy to regulate behaviour, and so forth.
Conclusion
Starting from John, for whom the debate between determinism and indeterminism is quite irrelevant, we had moved to our daily moral life, where we questioned whether an objective scientific view based on determinism and indeterminsm is even sustainable. We saw that even when we do change our views about moral responsibility in exceptional cases, these are not borne out of scientific answers to determinism. From thereon we discussed the overall social efficacy of upholding our views about moral responsibility, in enabling moral development, in affecting future outcomes and in sustaining our very institutions. Thus, I believe that the metaphysical answer to determinism or indeterminism, though quite an interesting subject in its own right, should not have affect the way we think about moral responsibility.
26 February 2015