The Case Against Facebook

As regards to a reasonable definition of a friend:

Proposition 1 : A minimum necessary condition for A to be considered a friend of B is that A helps when B is in need, as long as A knows that B needs help and it is in A’s capacity to help. 12

The minimum necessary condition in Proposition (1) is, however, too relaxed to identify a friend, since a large majority of strangers would satisfy it as well. This brings us to a second necessary condition:

Proposition 2 : A second necessary condition for A to be considered a friend of B is that A helps when B is in need, and A also seeks to acquire the knowledge whether B is in need or not, through normal perception or judgement.34

The two propositions result in the following natural characterization:

Proposition 3 : An egotist friend is someone who satisfies Proposition (1), except in cases of conflicting self-interest, and fails Proposition (2). A normal friend5 is one who satisfies both Proposition (1) and Propositions (2) as a minimum prerequisite, except maybe in cases of conflicting self interest. A selfless friend is one satisfies both Propositions (1) and Propositions (2), even in conditions of conflicting self-interest. 67

As Regards to Facebook:

Proposition 4 : The virtual proximity4 accorded by Facebook is a kind of proximity which gives an illusion of acquisition of knowledge of a friend’s circumstances, without giving that knowledge itself. This illusion is further deepened by the use of terminology which suggests otherwise -‘Newsfeed’ being one example. In particular, the view that Facebook surfing serves as a means to acquire the knowledge in Proposition (2) is mistaken.89

Proposition 5 : Facebook’s profile centric architecture with status updates as the dominant mode of interaction with your friend circle, in particular, promotes an egotistical view of the world, i.e. a world where one is at the centre in a circle of friends, as opposed to, say, an equal partner in a one-to-one friendship.10

Conclusion:

Proposition 6 : From Proposition (4) or Proposition (5) or both, it follows that Facebook tends to distort normal friendships into egotistical friendships.

  1. For clarification, anyone who argues against Proposition 1 would have to maintain that A can consistently refuse to help B (when B is in need and it is in A’s capacity to help without harming his/her own self interest), AND yet be a friend of B. ↩

  2. If helping B conflicts with A’s self-interest, then A maybe excused for failing to help - under this minimal criteria. However, if A helps B under all cases, even when helping B might harm A in some sense, then the helping criteria would be sufficient as well. This is suggested by the indeed in ‘A friend in need is a friend indeed’ - where A helps B regardless of his self-interest. ↩

  3. For clarification, if A is totally out of touch with B, and is never bothered about the circumstances of B, he is NOT considered a friend. One can argue that this is quite a strong criteria. But in response one can simply change this argument to apply to good friends (say), instead of mere friends, and the thrust of the argument would still hold. ↩

  4. To be clear, the acquisition of this knowledge need not have any costs at all. In most cases, A would know when B is in need or not solely by virtue of his/her close proximity. This is because proximity lowers the cost of acquisition of knowledge of whether a friend is in need or not. It facilitates, or enables, the knowledge. It would help to explore this notion of proximity further. Proximity could be physical or virtual, and it is argued that Social Networks make us virtually proximate. However, being proximate is not the criteria in Proposition 2 - A would fail the criteria if he/she has virtually proximity without knowledge (of B’s circumstances). On the other hand, if A doesn’t have close proximity but has knowledge (of B’s circumstances), say through news or other channels, and if A still helps B, then A makes the mark. Thus, the notion of proximity is valuable to the definition of friendship only as a means (to the knowledge), and not in itself. If the means do not lead to the end, as when proximity is of the nature that it doesn’t lead to the knowledge (the proximity in Proposition (4)), then that proximity is worthless for our notion of a friendship. ↩ ↩2

  5. Normal here means the notion of ‘friend’ as we understand it, or traditionalists do, as opposed to what Facebook might advocate. ↩

  6. For clarification, this proposition just deals with definitions, and shouldn’t be confused with an argument. ↩

  7. Being a selfless friend entails being a friend. This accords with the maxim ‘A friend in need is a friend indeed’. ↩

  8. This proximity is unlike the virtual proximity accorded by physical interaction or other forms of communication like Google Talk or Cellular Communication, where one has ready access to the relevant knowledge through perception or judgement or direct communication. ↩

  9. You never know get to know the important things - stuff that matters - for instance, whether someone got fired from his job, whether someone’s grandparents died, whether someone is going through a rough patch lately. ↩

  10. It might be argued that in the real world too, one see’s themself at the centre of the world, and by association, their friend circle. However, this argument is flawed on two counts. First, in the real world, our interactions are mediated by mirror neurons and hormones responsible for empathy, sympathy and other such feelings, so there’s a limit to how egotist one can be - a limit not present in the virtual world. Second, there are other forms of virtual communication - Phonecalls or Google Talk, for example, which do not have this ‘centre of a friend circle’ communication topology. ↩

02 February 2015